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Abstract—Recently, several works conjectured the vulnerabil-
ities of mainstream blockchains under several network attacks.
All these attacks translate into showing that the assumptions of
these blockchains can be violated in theory or under simulation
at best. Unfortunately, previous results typically omit both the
nature of the network under which the blockchain code runs and
whether blockchains are private, consortium or public.
In this paper, we study the public Ethereum blockchain as well
as a consortium and private blockchains and quantify the feas-
ibility of man-in-the-middle and double spending attacks against
them. To this end, we list important properties of the Ethereum
public blockchain topology, we deploy VMs with constrained
CPU quantum to mimic the top-10 mining pools of Ethereum and
we develop full-fledged attacks, that first partition the network
through BGP hijacking or ARP spoofing before issuing a Balance
Attack to steal coins. Our results demonstrate that attacking
Ethereum is remarkably devastating in a consortium or private
context as the adversary can multiply her digital assets by
200, 000× in 10 hours through BGP hijacking whereas it would
be almost impossible in a public context.
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchains, like Bitcoin [1] or Ethereum [2], implement
cryptocurrencies through a distributed system that relies heav-
ily on network communications. As the price of these crypto-
currencies have skyrocketed in the recent years, we are facing a
growing amount of network attacks to steal their corresponding
coins. These attacks are not new as in 2014, an attacker
acted as a man-in-the-middle by hijacking BGP routes in one
of the Canadian autonomous systems (ASes) to steal US$
83,000. Few days ago, another BGP hijacking attack against an
Ethereum wallet allowed an attacker to steal Ethereum coins or
ethers.1 Although this attack is simpler as it targeted a single
server, it illustrates the proliferation of network attacks against
blockchain.
In fact, communication delays can typically be exploited to
steal assets from blockchains. As transactions and blocks that
update the state of the blockchain are sent through the network,
distant nodes can observe conflicting transactions while these
transaction blocks are being propagated to all nodes. Consider
for example that a merchant observing a transaction t decides
to transfer a physical asset in the real world before receiving
the up-to-date state of the blockchain. If this transaction t gets
finally discarded due to an existing conflict, then the merchant
1https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/04/24/myetherwallet_dns_hijack.
loses its asset and the attacker can re-spend the coins he
spent in t, hence the name double spending. Double spending
remains a critical vulnerability of most blockchains that rely
on proof-of-work and resulted again in asset losses in the last
few weeks.2
Several research results confirmed that network delays affect
“in theory” the security of blockchain systems. In particular,
it is well known that delaying network messages can impact
Bitcoin [3], [4], [5], [6], [7] but only few results tried to
assess the vulnerability of Ethereum [8], [9]. Some attacks
rely on the simple idea, called solo-mining or selfish mining,
of delaying the propagation of blocks already mined [10], [11].
Other attacks require to delay the messages between one node
and the rest of the network [12], [8]. Finally, some attacks
involve partitioning the network by using man-in-the-middle
attacks [13], [9]. To our knowledge, however, there is no full-
fledged attack that combines (i) a real network attack to delay
the messages and then (ii) a double spending attack leveraging
these delays to steal from the blockchain. Current approaches
typically focus on either one of these two aspects.
By focusing only on the network attack feasibility in
blockchain, one can ignore the feasibility of generally stealing
digital assets in realistic settings. First, such results would
extrapolate the applicability of theoretical network attacks to
the public context and it remains unclear to which extent a
real attack can succeed in a public or consortium environment.
Second, the results that demonstrate the feasibility of a net-
work attack experimentally would ignore the pseudo random
process used at the heart of proof-of-work blockchains that
could presumably translate these attacks into successful asset
losses. While network attacks may implicitly contribute to
the risks of asset losses, the extent to which this is possible
depending on the environment remains unclear.
In this paper, we quantify empirically the risks for an
adversary to steal coins in Ethereum by executing (i) a man-
in-the-middle attack followed by a (ii) double spending attack.
To this end, we gathered connectivity and mining power
information of the Ethereum public blockchain, and setup an
Ethereum sandboxed testnet to mimick public, consortium and
private environments. Our testnet comprises BGP routers and
2https://www.newsbtc.com/2018/04/05/cryptocurrency-verge-has-been-hit-
with-a-51-attack-loses-250000-tokens/.
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VMs configured with OpenStack. We reflected the mining
power of the top-10 Ethereum mining pools by restricting
the CPU quantum of each VM with linux cgroups. We
then performed BGP hijacking and ARP spoofing to try
partitioning the networks before running a Balance Attack [9]
and measuring empirically the risks of double spending.
Our first conclusion is that stealing assets against public
blockchains is very hard due to the nature of the network
topology. Our second conclusion is that attacks against con-
sortium and private blockchains are surprisingly easy and lead
to dramatic losses. Finally, we quantify the asset gain of an
adversary that executes the attack continuously for a period of
time and we discuss the countermeasures to lower the risks of
man-in-the-middle attacks against Ethereum. Within roughly
10 hours, the adversary could gain as much as 200,000 folds
of their initial funding.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present
the background in Section II. We discuss in Section III why
network attacks against public Ethereum are not trivial. We
describe the experimental results of double spending with
BGP-Hijacking in a consortium deployment in Section IV. We
describe the experimental results of double spending through
ARP-spoofing in a private context in Section V. We discuss the
impact and also countermeasures of the attacks in Section VI.
In Section VII, we present related work from past research.
Finally, we conclude our paper in Section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATIONS
A blockchain system offers a tamper-proof ledger [14]
distributed on a collection of communicating nodes, all sharing
the same initial block of information, the genesis block. In
order to add information to the blockchain, a node includes
information in a block with a pointer to its parent block, this
creates a chain of blocks, hence called blockchain. To create
a block, a node usually needs to solve a crypto-puzzle and
provides the solution as a proof of its work to get a reward, this
process is called mining [1]. The difficulty of the crypto puzzle
is adjusted based on the total computational power or mining
power of the blockchain network. Each correctly behaving
miner needs to adhere to the same protocol for creating and
also validating new blocks. Upon successfully mining a block,
a miner broadcasts it for validation.
Unfortunately, network delays impact the time to hear about
new blocks and during that time miners may append multiple
blocks pointing to the same parent blocks, a situation called
a fork. Such forks may lead to different nodes accepting
conflicting information. If these forks persist, they may lead
to double spending [10], [15], where an adversary spends the
same coins in transactions located in two branches of the
forked blockchain. Intuitively, the longer the communication
delay, the longer the fork will remain undetected and persist.
To resolve forks, blockchain platforms implement a blockchain
consensus protocols to select a single branch as a canonical
chain. One way to resolve the issue is to simply choose
the longest branch whenever there are forks, leaving blocks
that are not part of the main chain as stale blocks [1].
Other variants exist, for example the GHOST protocol [5]
that initially influenced the Ethereum consensus protocol [2]
selects a canonical branch by considering total weight of the
subtrees including stale blocks.
A. Ethereum
Ethereum [2] is a proof-of-work blockchain platform that
initially claimed to implement a simplified version of a GHOST
consensus protocol, however, its current version differs signi-
ficantly from the GHOST protocol. Ethereum does not take
into account any stale block in the subtree when it decides the
canonical path. Instead, its branch selection process is solely
based on the total difficulty value, consisting of the summation
of difficulties of all the crypto puzzles of the block itself and
all of its ancestors, as a weight of each branch. Based on
the difficulty value, Ethereum selects the branch with highest
cumulated weight as a canonical branch. Unlike the original
GHOST protocol, which treats each block equally in term of
weight, a subtree with fewer number of blocks may be adopted
as long as its total difficulty is higher than the others.
B. Blockchain deployment environments
Blockchains are typically deployed in one of three com-
monly known environments depending on their access per-
missions: public, consortium, and private environments [16].
• Public blockchains are the most permissive among all
three; they are opened to any participant to access the
systems. As anyone is allowed to both read and write,
public blockchains generally rely on the Internet for
communication.
• Consortium blockchains are more restrictive than public
ones. Only a subset of the participating nodes may
contribute to the consensus protocol that will lead to
a new block being appended. The read permissions in
consortium blockchains could be either restricted to only
the consensus participants or to all the public participants.
A good example for this kind of blockchain would be a
consortium of financial institutions, who may compete
with one another. To serve such purpose, consortium
blockchains are usually deployed in environments that
consist of multiple organization networks often intercon-
nected by the Internet.
• Fully private blockchains are the most restrictive; the
write permissions are preserved to only one organization.
This type of blockchains could be deployed inthe private
network of a single company, these block chains are often
described as less interesting than the two other types
of blockchains as they may not face the same security
challenges.
C. Mining pools and stratum servers
Mining pools are groups of miners that combine their
computational power to mine blocks and share the rewards
among themselves. They are appealing in public blockchains
as they allow miners to receive a smaller yet more frequent
reward than if they were mining individually. Each mining
pool is viewed as a centralized miner from the rest of the
system, however, their connectivity to the system is different
from the connectivity of a central miner, as explained below.
At the heart of each pool is a small number of stratum
servers, which act as communication proxies between pool
members and the rest of the blockchain network. Information
from the blockchain network flows in and out the mining pool
via the stratum servers. These servers coordinate the crypto-
puzzle resolution by sending update and distributing workload
to pool members. This mechanism hides pool members behind
the stratum servers, such that their information is not exposed
to the blockchain network. Finally, a stratum server hides in-
formation of a pool member from one another, as it eliminates
the need for direct communication among the members.
D. The Balance Attack
The Balance Attack [9] is a recent theoretical generalization
of the delay attack against proof-of-work blockchains; it
relies on partitioning the network into subgroups of similar
mining power to achieve double spending with low mining
power. It does not experiment how network attack can delay
messages but rather focuses on the double spending risks when
assuming network delays. The attack is based on the fact that a
proof-of-work blockchain favors partition tolerance rather than
consistency, such that it still continues its usual operations
with inconsistency and forkable chains of information. The
adversary splits the whole blockchain network into multiple
subgroups with the aims of evenly balancing mining power of
all subgroups, while the access to all of these subgroups are
still protected from the adversary node.
The adversary can then perform double-spending by issuing
conflicting transactions to many subgroups at once; without
any communication among them, all the transactions will
likely be accepted, because each subgroup is unaware that the
same coins have been spent somewhere else. The adversary
could then influence the selection of the canonical chain
among multiple branches by contributing his mining power
to one of the subgroups. If the mining power is distributed
evenly among all subgroups, the advantage of the adversary
contribution makes one particular subgroup to possess higher
mining power than the others and thus increases the chance
for its branch to be adopted.
III. MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE DOUBLE SPENDING IN THE
PUBLIC ETHEREUM BLOCKCHAIN
In this section, we show experimentally how someone can
supposedly double spend by partitioning Ethereum and then
explain why the network connectivity makes the success of
this attack almost impossible.
In order to gain some insights regarding the public Eth-
ereum blockchain we combined the name and block contri-
butions of the top-10 mining pools as observed on http://
etherscan.io during one week on August 3rd, 2017 with
their network connectivity information in Table I. To this end,
to each named mining pool we registered a miner that could
gather IP and Autonomous System (AS) information. ASes
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Figure 1. Experimental topology for public network
are groups of networks under control of a single technical
administration [17]. In particular, we estimated locations of the
servers by querying 5 geo-IP databases [18], [19], [20], [21],
[22]. To reduce the inaccuracies of geo-locations, we extracted
the location indicated in the majority of these databases. To
retrieve the number and owner of each AS we relied on [23]
and [24], both sources are based on the whois service. ASes
have their own routing policy for internal traffic but use Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP) [25] for dynamic inter-AS routing.
Unfortunately, BGP does not incorporate a mechanism to
check whether an origin AS owns the IP prefixes that it an-
nounces. This makes a protocol vulnerable to route hijacking.
A. Double spending is easy in case of route hijacking
To quantify the risk of a partitioning attack, we emulated the
aforementioned Ethereum top-10 mining pools by deploying
10 virtual machines (VMs) linked through 5 BGP routers,
as shown in Figure 1, and controlled in our private cloud
infrastructure via OpenStack. To obtain the mining power
distribution of mining pools retrieved in Table I among our
own VMs, we fixed the quantum of CPU time allocated to
each machine using Linux cgroups [26]. cgroups allow
us to specify the CPU quota Q that a VM can consume within
a period of time T . Given the same value of T , we vary Q
on all virtual machines based on their correspondent mining
power percentage of the pools. As a result, we obtained the
proportion we listed in Table I close to 1 decimal.
We then combined a BGP-hijacking attack with the balance
attack [9] to evaluate the risks of double spending in Ethereum
v1.5. First, the BGP hijacking is used to delay communication,
then the balance attack is used to turn these delays into double
spending. To this end, we assign the role of the adversary to
one of the mining pool in each of our attack instances. As in-
dicated in Figure 1, the adversary takes control over one BGP
router to prevent AS1 and AS2 from communicating with AS4
and AS5 during 7 minutes. During that time, the adversary
issues a transaction to one group and contributes to the block
creation of the other group in order to discard its previously
issued transaction. Since it is commonly recommended to wait
for 12 confirmations to be confident about the immutability
of a transaction since the version Homestead of Ethereum, we
consider the double spending successful when the transactions
contained in a block followed by 11 consecutive blocks gets
discarded.
Table I
EXISTING TOP 10 ETHEREUM MINING POOLS WITH MINING POWER, STRATUM SERVERS, LOCATION AND AS NUMBERS FROM JULY 27th TO AUG. 3rd
Power (%) Pool Name Stratum Servers Location ASN AS Owner
27.02 f2pool eth.f2pool.com Hangzhou, China 37963 Alibaba (China) Technology Co., Ltd.
23.76 Ethermine
us1.ethermine.org Montreal, Canada 16276 OVH SAS
us2.ethermine.org California, US 63949 Linode, LLC
eu1.ethermine.org France 16276 OVH SAS
eu2.ethermine.org France 16276 OVH SAS
asia1.ethermine.org Singapore 16276 OVH SAS
9.73 miningpoolhub
us-east.ethash-hub.miningpoolhub.com Georgia, US 63949 Linode, LLC
europe.ethash-hub.miningpoolhub.com Hesse, Germany 63949 Linode, LLC
asia.ethash-hub.miningpoolhub.com Tokyo, Japan 63949 Linode, LLC
9.7 Nanopool
eth-eu1.nanopool.org France 16276 OVH SAS
eth-eu2.nanopool.org France or Italy 16276 OVH SAS
eth-asia1.nanopool.org Singapore 16276 OVH SAS
eth-us-east1.nanopool.org Montreal, Canada 16276 OVH SAS
eth-us-west1.nanopool.org California, US 20473 Choopa, LLC
9.12 ethfans guangdong-pool.ethfans.org Fujian, China 4134 No.31,Jin-rong Streethuabei-pool.ethfans.org Fujian, China 4134 No.31,Jin-rong Street
6.24 DwarfPool
eth-eu.dwarfpool.com France 16276 OVH SAS
eth-us.dwarfpool.com Montreal, Canada 16276 OVH SAS
eth-us2.dwarfpool.com Las Vegas, US 53667 FranTech Solutions
eth-ru.dwarfpool.com France 16276 OVH SAS
eth-asia.dwarfpool.com Taiwan 59253 Leaseweb Asia Pacific pte. ltd.
eth-cn.dwarfpool.com Shanghai, China 37963 Alibaba (China) Technology Co., Ltd.
eth-cn2.dwarfpool.com Beijing, China 37963 Alibaba (China) Technology Co., Ltd.
eth-sg.dwarfpool.com Singapore 59253 Leaseweb Asia Pacific pte. ltd.
eth-au.dwarfpool.com Melbourne, Australia 38880 Micron21 Melbourne Australia Datacentre
eth-ru2.dwarfpool.com Moscow, Russia 42632 MnogoByte LLC
eth-hk.dwarfpool.com Hong Kong 45102 Alibaba (China) Technology Co., Ltd.
eth-br.dwarfpool.com Sao Paulo, Brazil 262287 Maxihost Hospedagem de Sites Ltda
eth-ar.dwarfpool.com Rosario, Argentina 27823 Dattatec.com
4.45 BW ether.bw.com Wuhan, China 58563 CHINANET Hubei province network
3.34 Ethpool
us1.ethpool.org Montreal, Canada 16276 OVH SAS
us2.ethpool.org Montreal, Canada 16276 OVH SAS
eu1.ethpool.org France 16276 OVH SAS
asia1.ethpool.org Singapore 16276 OVH SAS
1.83 Coinotron coinotron.com Poland 51290 HOSTEAM-AS
0.88 Poolgpu eth.poolgpu.com Hangzhou, China 37963 Alibaba (China) Technology Co., Ltd.
96.07 Total
After the 7 minutes communication delay, we observed
whether the adversary transaction is discarded due to the
choice of the canonical chain in 30 consecutive runs and
concludes upon the average success of the attack. As indicated
in Table II, we observe that only 10% of the mining power
is sufficient for the double spending to be successful most of
the time. With only 27% of the mining power, the success of
the attack reaches 76%.
This result confirms the claim from the literature that it is
supposedly feasible to attack public blockchains [13], however,
this is without taking into account the nature of the network
topology. We explain in Section III-B why the topology
described in Table I makes the attack of the public Ethereum
blockchain almost impossible.
B. Partitioning Ethereum mining pools turns out to be hard
While we showed that double spending could be easily
achieved by partitioning public blockchains, it turns out that
partitioning the mining power of Ethereum mining pools is
almost impossible.
Table I lists the stratum servers of the top-10 Ethereum
mining pools we retrieved. We noticed experimentally that
if one of the stratum server become unresponsive, then the
Stratum
server
Pool
participant
Primary
connection
Backup
connection
Figure 2. Hypothetical stratum servers and pool participants
corresponding miners would connect to the next stratum
server they operate in order to remain connected to the pool.
Hence, partitioning may result in having miners reconnect to
a different AS. As an example, consider Figure 2, where a
miner in India primarily connected to Europe may reconnect
to China.
In addition, it is more difficult to determine the precise
proportion of mining power connected to each stratum server,
again due to the numerous stratum servers each miner operates.
Indeed, a mining pool identifier is nothing more than the wallet
address to receive reward when a pool successfully mines a
block. While it is possible to determine a block miner by
examining header information, there is no way to pin down
to the stratum server, as long as these servers put their reward
into the same wallet address.
Second, the stratum servers typically hide the location of
the mining pool participants, which makes it hard to isolate a
group of pools of a specific mining power. In particular and
as described in Figure 2, one cannot prevent a miner from
India to reconnect to a stratum node located in China. Without
information about the miners for a stratum server, one cannot
guarantee the partition success of a network attack. It may
(i) isolate a stratum server along with its miners completely,
(ii) partition some miners, which reduces only a fraction
of computational power from the pool, or (iii) cut off the
connectivity between a stratum server and pool participants,
such that those participants decide to reconnect to different
stratum servers.
Third, BGP-hijacking cannot affect the direct interconnec-
tion between ASes, because ASes are aware of static network
prefixes that belong to their peer ASes. Apart from exchanging
routes at the Internet Exchange Points (IXPs), any pair of
ASes may decide to establish either layer 2 or layer 3 links
to connect their networks directly. This prevents dynamic
routing attacks like the BGP hijacking we discussed above
in Section III-A. To better understand the applicability of the
attack to the Ethereum public blockchain, we retrieved the
direct peering information of the 8 ASes we identified using
available information [27] and listed these interconnections in
Figure 3. Among the top-10 public Ethereum mining pools,
7 of them solely rely on this group of ASes; together, they
account for more than 87% from the total mining power of
the network. As the majority of ASes in this group are linked
by direct peering, it appears extremely difficult to partition
Ethereum’s overlay. For example, f2pool may send and
update to ethfans via a peering connection, which in turn
forwards the update to BW via another peering connection.
Without an adversary gaining access to configuration on the
border routers of these ASes, it will remain difficult to partition
a pool from the rest of the group.
IV. MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE DOUBLE SPENDING IN A
CONSORTIUM ETHEREUM BLOCKCHAIN
As opposed to the previous section, we now focus on a
consortium context and show how easy it is to double spend
in Ethereum. Since participants can be located in different re-
gions around the globe, the members of a consortium typically
use the Internet and multiple ASes for communicating. For
the sake of simplicity, let us consider that all members have
an equal amount of mining power.3 Although the consortium
may include competitors, these are usually not incentivized to
participate based on a mining rewards. This is why there is
3A skewed distribution of mining power among members makes the attack
easier as quantified theoretically [9].
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Figure 3. The inter-AS connections among the group of ASes that host stratum
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two adjacent ASes or a peering connection, while a dash line indicates the
existence of an indirect path between two ASes that requires only one transit
AS in the middle.
generally no mining pools in consortia and it is quite easy to
double spend as we illustrate below.
A. Setting up a double spending attack with BGP-hijacking
In order to quantify the risks of one member of the consor-
tium to steal assets from its competitors, we deployed a testnet
of 9 VMs: one adversary and two groups of similar mining
power of 4 VMs each. All VMs run go-ethereum or geth
version 1.5 (Ethereum Homestead) and are connected through
a network similar to the previous experiments configured
with different message latency to mimic multiple realistic
geographical scales: from almost no delay to 250 ms delay.
We setup an Ethereum overlay so that every node is connected
to one another through a fully mesh logical topology that we
manually configured.
To provide connectivity among the nodes, 5 routers are used
similar to the configuration shown in Figure 1 where stratum
server 8 is removed and where the remaining stratum servers
are replaced by miners. Each router employs a Quagga BGP
daemon [28] that advertises reachability to the adjacent net-
works to its neighbors. By repeating this process, each router
is eventually informed about the location of any destination
network of some AS. Upon reception of the advertisement,
the BGP process running in each router uses the information
of all these advertised paths to update its routing table.
We now described how one node selected as the adversary
can exploits BGP hijacking to get full control of a router
and double spend. Initially, all BGP routers are properly
configured, where communication of nodes between two legit-
imate ASes are routed via either 4 or 2 BGP routers, depending
on the location of the AS. To start the attack, the adversary first
configures a router under its control to maliciously advertise,
to the neighbor routers, non-existing direct routes to those two
ASes.
Since there is no mechanism to check the validity of all
networks in an advertisement message, the neighbor routers
Table II
SUCCESS OF DOUBLE SPENDING WITH MINING POOLS OF SIMILAR POWER TO THE TOP 10 ETHEREUM MINING POOLS FROM JULY 27th TO AUG. 3rd
Mining power of members
in an adversary subgroup (%)
Adversary The rest of subgroup
Mining power of members
in a victim subgroup (%)
Difference between
two subgroups
Double Spending
Success rate (%)
27.02 23.76, 6.24, 3.34, 0.88 9.73, 9.7, 9.12, 4.45, 1.83 26.41 76.7
23.76 27.02, 6.24, 1.83, 0.88 9.73, 9.7, 9.12, 4.45, 3.34 23.39 63.3
9.73 27.02, 9.12, 4.45, 1.83, 0.88 23.76, 9.7, 6.24, 3.34 9.99 56.7
9.70 27.02, 9.12, 4.45, 1.83, 0.88 23.76, 9.73, 6.24, 3.34 9.93 43.3
9.12 27.02, 9.7, 4.45, 1.83, 0.88 23.76, 9.73, 6.24, 3.34 9.93 43.3
6.24 27.02, 9.7, 4.45, 3.34 23.76, 9.73, 9.12, 1.83, 0.88 5.43 40
4.45 27.02, 9.7, 6.24, 1.83, 0.88 23.76, 9.73, 9.12, 3.34 4.17 40
3.34 27.02, 9.7, 6.24, 1.83, 0.88 23.76, 9.73, 9.12, 4.45 1.95 43.3
1.83 27.02, 9.7, 6.24, 3.34, 0.88 23.76, 9.73, 9.12, 4.45 1.95 33.3
0.88 27.02, 9.7, 6.24, 3.34, 1.83 23.76, 9.73, 9.12, 4.45 1.95 26.7
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Figure 4. Difficulty chart during a 30 minute network partitioning
will simply accept such routes as a route modification and
update their routing tables. This adds the malicious router as
an extra hop in the middle of two ASs, which create the path of
5 BGP routers instead of 4 for both westbound and eastbound
communications. Next, the adversary blocks or drops a certain
type of the traffic (Ethereum traffic in this case), while the
adversary still holds the capability to talk with both ASs.
As a consequence, the Ethereum blockchain is partitioned
into two subgroups with the adversary in the middle of the
communication path.
To exploit this partition to double spend, the adversary
then proceed as in the Balance Attack [9] by issuing two
conflicting transactions, each of them to one subgroup. Each of
the transactions transfers more than half of the coins available
in the wallet, so that they are clearly in conflict. After that,
the adversary waits long enough for a transaction on the
victim side to get committed, which results in waiting for a
block to include the transaction and the observation that a
sufficient number of subsequence blocks were mined. Finally,
after a sufficiently long period of time, the adversary simply
stops BGP hijacking and lets the two Ethereum subgroups
reconnect. When the network is no longer partitioned, the
Ethereum protocol selects the branch that does not contain the
transaction included in the blockchain by the victim subgroup.
Any real goods purchased with this transaction will be owned
by the adversary despite leaving no trace of this transaction
or purchase.
Table III
DOUBLE SPENDING SUCCESS RATE WITH BGP HIJACKING IN A
CONSORTIUM DEPLOYMENT
Attack Duration (min)
Network Delay 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
<1 ms 3 % 23 % 57 % 60 % 53 % 60 % 77 % 63 % 80 % 77 %
250 ms 10 % 30 % 47 % 47 % 63 % 50 % 53 % 43 % 60 % 63 %
B. Success of double spending after a BGP-hijacking attack
As mentioned in Section II, Ethereum adjusts the difficulty
of their crypto puzzles on every block; our experiments reveal
that, however, the adaptation does not reach convergence
fast enough to reflect the change in mining power of the
network. Figure 4 shows the variation of the crypto puzzle
difficulty over time, both before and during the man-in-the-
middle attack. During the network partition, the mining power
on an adversary subgroup and victim subgroup are 55.6% and
44.4% respectively. Looking closely at the difficulty trend in
Figure 4(b), we can observe that the values fluctuate during
some time, while the overall trend is going downward. One
may imagine the difficulty on the adversary side to be much
higher than the victim side, because of the about 11% higher
mining power, but this is also not the case here. Furthermore,
one could expect the difficult to drop to roughly 2.1 Million
Hashes (MH), which is about half of its previous value; the
difficulty value, however, still remains higher than 4.17 MH
even after 30 minutes.
Table III shows the average number of successful attempts
of double spending from 30 trials for each attack duration,
while Figure 5 shows the average number of block mined
by the adversary subgroup versus the victim subgroup. The
blue horizontal line in Figure 5 represents the baseline of
12 confirmations, in other word, the transaction has ob-
tained enough subsequent blocks to be considered committed.
Table III indicates that a 3-minute attack duration hardly yields
a successful double spending, this is because the time is too
short for the miners on each subgroup to mine enough blocks
to commit (or obtain sufficient confirmations for) a transaction.
Results from this experiment illustrate that the adversary may
perform double spending with high chance of success, such
as more than 75% with an attack lasting 9 minutes. We can
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Figure 6. Block Count during the BGP hijacking based on duration of network
segmentation with 250ms delay
also see in the Figure 5 that, as expected, the longer the attack
duration, the high number of block created during the attack.
We then perform a similar experiment while artificially
introducing 250 ms of delay between two ASes on the left
and on the right of the network topology. Similarly to the
previous experiment, Table III and Figure 6 present the average
number of successful attempts from 30 trials for each attack
duration and the average number of blocks mined by two
subgroups respectively. We can see that both adversary and
victim subgroups produce less blocks than in the first set of
experiments without delay. It results in a lower probability of
double spending success on average. This may be due to fact
that delays slow down the block propagation, thus the system
is likely to mine more stale blocks, which in turn reduces the
success rate.
To summarize, our experiments exhibited several trends.
First, we saw that the attack duration contributes to the success
of double spending, both with or without artificial delays.
After a certain attack duration, the success no longer increases
significantly, as can be seen by the slight success increase
between 9 and 12 minutes. Second, from the comparison
between the experiment with and without delays, we can see
that the delays among peers in the topology directly affects
the probability of the attack. The higher the delay of the
network, the lower the chance of successful attack. Finally, it
is important to note that even though double spending did not
succeed in all our experiments, we were able to successfully
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Figure 7. Experimental Topology for Local Area Network
perform BGP hijacking successfully.
V. MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE DOUBLE SPENDING IN A
PRIVATE ETHEREUM BLOCKCHAIN
In this section, we show the feasibility of double spending
on the private Ethereum blockchain using another man-in-the-
middle attack. For the purpose of this work, we define a private
blockchain as a group of Ethereum miners peering within the
same AS via a local area network (LAN) with low latency.
Note that this is reasonable to use an Ethernet network with
a single layer 2 broadcast domain in the private blockchain
context. Considering that a minimum network security can be
in place in these network, the adversary may exploit an ARP-
spoofing attack to take the control of the network without the
need for any configuration change on network elements. As
there is less demand to compete among the miners in this
setting, we will assume that all of the nodes possess the same
amount of computing resources.
A. Setting up of a double spending attack with ARP spoofing
To quantify the chance of successful double spending attack
on Ethereum in a private blockchain context, we run the ex-
periment on our private cloud infrastructure with a low latency
network. The setup is similar to the previous experiment for
a consortium context, except that all of the virtual machines
are linked together via a physical Ethernet switch. As a result,
we have deployed a topology as shown in Figure 7.
In the private blockchain context, our adversary employs
ARP spoofing technique [29] to perform a man-in-the-middle
attack. Since there is no authentication mechanism used in a
common ARP protocol, the adversary can send IP packets with
fabricated MAC address. Considering a simple communication
between node A and B, the adversary can tell node A that node
B’s IP address is mapped to its MAC address and vice versa.
Any packet from node sent to node B then route through the
adversary first; as a consequence, the adversary may disrupt
the communication by delaying the network traffic. By posi-
tioning itself in the middle of a communication path among all
of the minders, the adversary separates the blockchain network
into two subgroups, while they still hold the capability to
communicate with both of them. Under this circumstance, the
adversary may issue two conflicting transactions to perform
double spending similar to what we explained in Section IV.
Table IV
DOUBLE SPENDING SUCCESS RATE WITH ARP SPOOFING
Attack Duration (min)
Network Delay 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
<1 ms 7 % 23 % 47 % 53 % 57 % 67 % 47 % 53 % 67 % 80 %
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Figure 8. Block Count during the ARP Attack based on duration of network
segmentation
B. Success of double spending after an ARP spoofing attack
Results obtained from experiments in a private context
exhibit similar behaviors to the consortium environment.
Table IV shows the average number of successful double
spending from 30 runs in function of the attack duration,
while Figure 8 shows the average number of block mined
by both adversary and victim subgroups. In this context, we
observed as expected that the longer the attack duration, the
higher number of block mined by both adversary and victim
subgroups. We observed that the double spending success
rate reaches its highest probability at 80% with 12 minutes
attack duration. The overall trend is similar to a consortium
blockchain, however, we observe a drop for an attack during
9 minutes. While we cannot clearly explain this event, we
hypothesize that is could be due to the randomness of block
mining in Ethereum.
In our experiment, the ARP-spoofing attack always suc-
ceeded (i.e., the network was successfully partitioned), how-
ever there are shortcomings that decrease its of chance of
success in practice. By contrast with BGP hijacking, the
adversary doing an ARP spoofing does not require any control
of network entity. The adversary node needs, however, to bear
the burden of all communication traffic among the miners in
the blockchain network, hence causing an additional overhead
of the adversary. Further, the risk of ARP-spoofing attack can
be greatly reduced with a network protection feature within the
switches. In particular, most modern network switches have
capability to detect and restrict the number of MAC addresses
per a network port, which in turn prevents ARP-spoofing; such
a feature is usually turned on by default on non-consumer
hardware as well as in virtualized environments.
Overall, double spending with an ARP spoofing attack
shows a similar trend as with a BGP hijacking attack. While
the local network was successfully partitioned, a low attack
duration, such as 3 minutes, hardly results in a successful
double spending. The probability of the attack increases to
certain degree as the attack duration lasts longer. Similarly,
the increase in success rate eventually reaches a plateau after
some attack duration is reached.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the consequences of double
spending using man-in-the-middle attacks against Ethereum
blockchain, as well as potential countermeasures. To begin
with, we want to quantify the attack impact depending on the
time the adversary runs the attack continuously, as this could
happen in a real-world blockchain situation where a system
is not under constant monitoring. Later, we present three
simple countermeasures that could be used by any merchant
to mitigate this impact.
A. Analysis
As shown in our experiments, the chance of successful
double spending is relatively high with respect to the discon-
nection period. In order to better quantify the impact of such
an attack, we can now estimate what the adversary would
gain from the running continuously the attack within a 10
hour period. In this illustrative scenario, we assume that the
adversary has a certain amount of currency in the system as
an initial fund; to simplify the calculation we will use 1 as
a number of this initial fund. In each attempt, we let the
adversary spend a third of the amount of coins available in
the account; the adversary is allowed to split the amount into
multiple accounts in order to transfer only one third during
the attack. If a double spending attempt is successful, the
adversary will gain one third more in his account balance,
which will be used as a fund for the next attempt. To simplify
the calculation further, we do not take into account any
transaction processing fee.
Overall, we can compute the potential gain after each
attempt as yi+1 = yi(1 + 2p−13 ), where yi is the adversary
fund after the ith attack and p is the attack success probability.
The gain after i attempts is thus yi = (1 + 2p−13 )
iy0, where
y0 is the initial fund. As shown above, the chance of attack
success depends of the attack period. Let T be the duration
of the attack, the potential gain y(t) at any given time t then
becomes:
y(t) =
(
1 +
2p− 1
3
)t/T
y0. (1)
By exploiting the results presented in Table III, we can
estimate using Equation (1) the potential gain after 10 hours
of an adversary using a 9 minute attack duration as 201,903
folds of the initial balance.
B. Countermeasures
Although it is almost impossible to completely eliminate
double spending risks due to the inherent “forkable” design
of Ethereum, we believe that there is a range of simple
countermeasures that could be used to lower this risk.
1) Increasing the number of confirmations before consider-
ing a transaction as committed: The simplest countermeasure
already in use is for the merchant to simply wait for a higher
number of confirmations, i.e., a number of subsequent blocks
after the transaction appears. Not only will the attack duration
be more difficult to achieve, but it also increases the chance
that the attack will be detected or disrupted by a number of
configuration changes. There is however a major drawback
to this approach. Because the merchant needs to wait for a
higher number of subsequent blocks, which results in a longer
period of time before sending the items, it definitely slows
down the responsiveness of the system. While 9 minutes is
sufficient to yield high profit based on the results presented in
Section IV, once we change to 40 confirmations instead of 11
in the vanilla Ethereurm, 9 and 10 minutes attack durations
with BGP hijacking result in only 3.33% and 6.67% success
rate respectively. Even a 12 minutes attack duration only gives
a double spending success rate of 43.33%. While this approach
requires the attack to take longer, it cannot fully prevent it.
2) Selectively choosing peers for query transaction status:
For an adversary to perform a double spending, the issued
transaction that pays a merchant must be committed on only
a group of miners but not anywhere else. In doing so, an
adversary must be aware of a group of miners that the
merchant uses for a transaction verification. For a merchant,
one then needs to verify whether an issued transaction is
committed before delivery of the items. If a merchant sees
that a transaction status is committed and delivers the good,
there is a risk of double spending. Before delivery, however,
a merchant could mitigate the risk by simply querying a
transaction status from many miners, including a group of
nodes that are located further away in the network topology,
such as two nodes in different ASes. The higher number of
nodes in the verification, the less chance for an adversary
to alter a transaction status from the merchant’s view. Also,
if a merchant cannot reach to majority of miners in the
other networks or ASes, it could be a sign that there is a
network partitioning. Unfortunately, the very notion of public
blockchain makes this idea of majority vague and risks to limit
the availability of the system.
3) Leveraging multiple network paths: One important re-
quirement for the adversary to perform a man-in-the-middle
attack in general is the ability to control some of the network
paths. One may mitigate such a risk by leveraging multihomed
ASes and multihomed hosts for a consortium and a private
blockchain environment, respectively. Networks and hosts
must be configured to allow miners to communicate with
their peers using two or more network paths. This approach
makes the attack more difficult because the adversary must
control more than a single network point. While the approach
does not eliminate all the risks, it requires more effort from
the adversary to execute the attack. The more network paths
in used, the less likely a man-in-the-middle attack against
Ethereum will succeed.
4) Consistent blockchains: As the environments in which
Ethereum is the most vulnerable are the consortium and private
contexts, a simple approach is to use alternative blockchain
systems that favor consistency over availability under the
assumption that the number of malicious users is strictly lower
than a third of the system. Such examples include Hyperledger
Fabric [30] that can guarantee atomic broadcast and the Red
Belly Blockchain [31] that solves the blockchain consensus.
By favoring consistency, these blockchains first guarantee that
a new block satisfies a total order over the whole set of blocks
that the blockchain contains before appending it. This also
means that such blockchains may not be available in the case
that no such block can be found. Finally, their guarantees are
not clearly defined in the case where a coalition of more than
a third of participants misbehave.
VII. RELATED WORK
Perhaps the most basic form of attack requires a transaction
to be committed as soon as it is included in a block [10], [32],
[33]. The first attack of this kind is called Finney’s attack
and consists of solo-mining a block with a transaction that
sends coins to itself without broadcasting it before issuing a
transaction that double-spends the same coin to a merchant.
When the goods are delivered in exchange of the coins, the
attacker broadcasts its block to override the payment of the
merchant. The vector76 attack [11] consists of an attacker
solo-mining after block b0 a new block b1 containing a
transaction to a merchant to purchase goods. Once another
block b′1 is mined after b0, the attacker quickly sends b1 to the
merchant for an external action to be taken. If b′1 is accepted
by the system, the attacker can issue another transaction with
the coins spent in the discarded block b1.
The attacks become harder if the external action is taken
after the transaction is committed by the blockchain. Rosen-
feld’s attack [15] consists of issuing a transaction to a mer-
chant. The attacker then starts solo-mining a longer branch
while waiting for m blocks to be appended so that the
merchant takes an external action in response to the commit.
The attack success probability depends on the number m of
blocks the merchant waits before taking an external action and
the attacker mining power. However, when the attacker has
more mining power than the rest of the system, the attack,
also called majority hashrate attack or 51-percent attack, is
guaranteed successful, regardless of the value m. To make the
attack successful when the attacker owns only a quarter of
the mining power, the attacker can incentivize other miners to
form a coalition [34] until the coalition owns more than half
of the total mining power.
It is well known that delaying network messages can
impact Bitcoin [3], [4], [5], [6], [7]. Several attacks hence
benefited from an attacker able to attack the communication
graph [4], [5], [7]. Decker and Wattenhoffer already observed
that Bitcoin suffered from block propagation delays [3].
In 2014, a BGP hijacker exploited access to an ISP to
steal $83000 worth of bitcoins by positioning itself between
Bitcoin pools and their miners [35]. At the application level,
some work showed that an attacker controlling 32 IP addresses
can “eclipse” a Bitcoin node with 85% probability [12].
Godel et al. [6] analyzed the effect of propagation delays on
Bitcoin using a Markov process. Garay et al. [36] investigated
Bitcoin in the synchronous communication setting, however,
this setting is often considered too restrictive [37]. Pass et al.
extended the analysis for when the bound-on message delivery
is unknown and showed in their model that the difficulty of
Bitcoin’s crypto-difficulty has to be adapted depending on the
bound on the communication delays [4].
Even though the propagation strategy of Ethereum differs
from the pull strategy of Bitcoin, some network attacks against
Bitcoin could affect Ethereum. In the Eclipse attack [12] the
attacker forces the victim to connect to 8 of its malicious
identities. The Ethereum adaptation would require to forge
3× more identities and force as many connections as the
default number of clients is 25. Apostolaki et al. [13] proposed
a BGP hijacking attack and showed that the number of
Internet prefixes that need to be hijacked for the attack to
succeed depends on the distribution of the mining power. BGP-
hijacking typically requires the control of network operators
but is independent from Bitcoin and could potentially be
exploited to delay network messages and execute a Balance
attack in Ethereum.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper presented the first fully implemented attack
against blockchain that incorporates both components of an
attack against blockchain, namely a network attack and an
asset loss using double spending. This complete attack has
been deployed against the Ethereum blockchain system in dif-
ferent contexts. In the context of the public blockchain, based
on real-world data, we quantified and discussed the feasibility
of a network partitioning attack. We found that while such
an attack is theoretically possible, the risks of succeeding in
stealing assets remains extremely low in practice.
For the first time, we also presented an analysis of the
vulnerabilities of Ethereum in both consortium and private
contexts. When Ethereum is deployed over a WAN in a
consortium environment, we demonstrated that an adversary
who has control on their border-gate could easily perform a
network partitioning attack, through BGP hijacking, with a
double-spending success rate up-to 80%. Similarly, in a private
environment, we showed that, using the ARP spoofing attack,
an adversary could double-spend with a success rate up to
80%. Overall, in this two Ethereum contexts, an adversary
could significantly (200,000-fold) gain by reproducing the
attack continuously during 10 hours.
While the potential consequences of these attacks are im-
pressive, we have also proposed a set of counter-measures.
Short-term measures consist of increasing the number of
confirmations. Long-term ones consist of monitoring network
actively. Implementing active monitoring is part of our future
work.
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APPENDIX
How effective is the man-in-the-middle attack on Ethereum
depends on the consensus protocol used, therefore it is essen-
tial to understand how it works under the hood. To determine
the canonical path through the entire block tree, Ethereum
implements its own protocol [2]. Although stated by its author
that Ethereum uses simplified version of GHOST, as purposed
in [5], we have found that there exist differences in many
aspects between the two. In this sense, knowing how such a
protocol works behind the scene is important to realize the
impact of any network attack. In this section, we look deeply
into the differences and also misconceptions related to Eth-
ereum’s consensus protocol. First, we demystify its canonical
branch selection process. Then, we explain the reason how
this blockchain platform takes into account of uncle blocks.
Although it sounds similar to a part of original GHOST
protocol, Ethereum incorporates this part of mechanism for
another purpose. Lastly, we explain the difficulty adjustment
algorithm used in the blockchain platform.
1) Choosing a canonical branch: Fork or branching is a
common phenomenon for proof-of-work blockchains. In order
to enter new information into the system, a node needs to
put the information in a form of block with a pointer to its
parent block. To create a block a node need to solve the crypto
puzzle as a proof of its work; this process is called mining.
Each miner needs to adhere to the same protocol for creating
and also validating new blocks. If a miner successfully mine
a block, it will broadcast to its neighbors, which can then
validate the block. Other miners may continue competing to
mine more block based on the latest one onward, and a miner
will be award the reward for its work. For this incentive, all the
miners will compete with each others to create new blocks to
get their rewards. Unfortunately, not all the miners will receive
latest update about the global state or the latest blocks at all
time; the situation leads to a fork, where there are more than
one blocks point to the same parent block.
To address the fork, blockchain platforms require to im-
plement consensus protocols. Nakamoto consensus simply
chooses the longest branch whenever there are forks, leaving
blocks which are not part of the main chain as stale blocks,
wasted efforts [1]. Currently, this is the protocol used in Bit-
coin, but its capability to support high volume of transactions
is still questionable by the community. One of the attempts to
tackle the scalability issue is a GHOST consensus protocol.
Instead of looking at the longest path, GHOST selects a
canonical branch by considering total weight of the subtrees
including stale blocks.
Ethereum claims that it implements a simplified version of
a GHOST consensus protocol; to our knowledge, nonethe-
less, it is not true in several respects. As a proof-of-work
blockchain, Ethereum comes up with its own approach in
order to select canonical branch. Although Ethereum states
that its implementation is based on the original GHOST
protocol, it does not take into account of any stale block in
the subtree when it decides the canonical path. Instead, its
branch selection process is solely based on the total difficulty
value, the summation of difficulty of all the crypto puzzles
of the block itself and also all of its ancestors, as a weight
of each branch. Based on this total difficulty value, Ethereum
plainly picks the branch with highest accumulated weight as a
canonical branch. Unlike Nakamoto consensus or the original
GHOST protocol, which treat each block equally in term of
weight, a subtree with fewer number of block may be adopted
as long as its total difficulty is higher than the others.
Algorithm 1 Total Difficulty Calculation in Ethereum
function GET-TOTAL-DIFF(block)
if block is genesis-block then
return genesis-block.difficulty
else
return block.difficulty + get-total-diff(block.parent)
end if
end function
2) Stale blocks and uncles: Although it is taken into
account for the weight calculation, Ethereum instead incorpor-
ates stale block rewarding system which is not a part of the
original GHOST protocol. The Ethereum’s author mentions
that the large mining pools tend to have an advantage over
small mining pools in term of propagation delay [?]. When
any pool mine a new block, such a pool could start mining
a new block right away without waiting for a block to reach
other miners, thus the system tend to be centralized from this
point of view. Whenever a large mining pool successfully mine
a block, it has a higher chance compare to the rest of miners to
successfully mine the next block, because it could start mining
ahead of them while other miners do not receive announcement
of the latest block yet. For this reason, Ethereum introduces
stale block rewarding system in its consensus protocol to
provide incentive to the miners who could contribute stale
blocks despite those blocks are not part of canonical chain.
This mechanism helps keep the small miners stay alive.
However, Ethereum does not give reward to every stale
block. A block may optionally refer to two other stale blocks
as its uncles; no more than two blocks are allowed. Further,
only stale blocks within seven generation distance from the
current block can be included as uncle blocks [?]. Although
Ethereum gives reward to uncle blocks, those blocks are not
take into account in weight calculation when selecting the head
of canonical branch. From this perspective, the higher number
of uncle blocks does not help in securing or promoting higher
rate of transaction.
3) Difficulty adjustment algorithm: Aiming to be a block-
chain platform of generic applications, Ethereum’s authors de-
cide to allow its block generation at much higher rate compare
to Bitcoin. To control the rate of new blocks, both Bitcoin and
Ethereum employ the similar mechanism, the difficulty of the
crypto puzzle. Each block contains the difficulty for itself to
be mined as one of its attributes. Target block time for Bitcoin
is 10 minutes, whereas the most recent average block time to
create a block in Ethereum is 15 seconds. Difficulty in the
former will be changed every 2016 blocks; the latter adjusts
the difficulty for every new blocks.
Algorithm 2 Difficulty Adjustment Algorithm
function GET-DIFF-ADJUSTMENT(block, parent)
fraction = b(parent.difficulty÷ 2048c
interval = block.timestamp - parent.timestamp
factor = max(1 - b(interval÷ 10)c, -99)
return fraction * factor
end function
function GET-DIFF-BOMB(block)
exponent = b(block.number÷ 100000)c − 2
return b2exponentc
end function
function GET-DIFFICULTY(block)
parent = block.parent
adjustment = get-diff-adjustment(block, parent)
bomb = get-diff-bomb(block)
return parent.difficulty + adjustment + bomb
end function
Any block with a number greater than zero need to calculate
its difficulty after solving crypto puzzle by using the value of
its parent as a base. There are two parts in difficulty update
algorithm to vary the value from as the chain grow. The
first part, as illustrated in a function get-diff-adjustment in an
algorithm 2, varies the difficulty based on the time a miner
used to find the answer for crypto puzzle; this is calculated by
subtract timestamp of its parent from timestamp of the current
block. For this part, a miner will increase the difficulty if and
only if the time it takes to mine a block is less than 10 seconds.
If the amount of time falls into a range between 10 to 19, the
difficulty will remain the same with its parent. If the time a
miner takes to create a block, however, greater than or equal
to 20, the difficulty will be decreased.
The second part, as shown in a function get-diff-bomb, is
purely based on the block number; it is known as the difficulty
bomb among Ethereum community. Because of a plan to
switch from proof of work to proof of stake in the future, the
developers decide to incorporate the difficulty bomb as a part
of difficulty adjustment algorithm. The role of the difficulty
bomb is to exponentially increase the difficulty over time to
the point that it is no longer worth for any miner to mine a
block in comparison to small incentive gain. When that point
is reached, the developers will take the opportunity to switch
Ethereum into proof-of-stake blockchain.
